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Abstract 
US public pension funds deficits remain stubbornly high even though market conditions have im-
proved in the post-crisis period. This article examines the role of lower short- and long-term in-
terest rates imposed by the use of unconventional monetary policy on pension funds risk taking 
and asset allocation behavior. We quantify the effects of the Zero Lower Bound policy and the 
launch of unconventional monetary policy measures by using two structural Vector AutoRegres-
sion (VAR) models, a Bayesian VAR and a Markov switching-structural VAR. We provide the 
first comprehensive evidence showing that persistently low interest rates and falling Treasury 
yields cause a substantial increase in pension funds risk and portfolios beta. Additionally, we 
document that the severe funding shortfall in many pension schemes is, to a large extent, associ-
ated with and prompted by changes in the monetary policy framework.  
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1. Introduction 
“More than half of the largest local governments in the U.S. have liabilities from pen-
sion underfunding that exceed 100% of their revenues” (Moody’s Investors Service, Global 
Credit Research, 26 September 2013).  
Over the last decade, underfunding pension obligations has been a credit pressure and 
a key to a broader retirement crisis. The rise in life expectancy, which increases liabilities in a 
significant manner (Brown et al., 2005; Cocco and Gomes 2012), and the immense challeng-
es in the asset allocation landscape, render the financing of these liabilities more difficult than 
ever (Cocco et al., 2005; Franzoni and Marin, 2006). Official estimates of US public pension 
fund shortfalls are in the range of $700 billion to $1 trillion, while the financial meltdown of 
2008 exacerbated the underfunding problem.
1
 In the aftermath of the last financial crisis, the 
average ratio of pension assets to liabilities (the funding ratio) plummeted from 95% as of 
fiscal year-end 2007 to 64% by fiscal year-end 2009, and recovered modestly to 74% for the 
2013 fiscal year.
2
 However, this recovery in assets is not sufficient to cover US pension lia-
bilities. 
The severe funding gap has triggered increased interest among academics, practition-
ers, and policymakers in understanding the investment strategy and risk-taking behavior of 
the public pension fund industry. Lucas and Zeldes (2009) show that the accounting rules for 
public pensions create an irregular incentive to invest in equities since projected liabilities are 
discounted and calculated on the basis of expectations for investment return, instead of at a 
rate that reflects the risk of the liabilities. Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011) document that pen-
sion funds exploit a loose regulation to camouflage their liabilities by investing in the stock 
market, which results in a higher discount rate being allowed for their liabilities.
3
 Evidently, 
                                                          
1
 This figure is obtained using the calculation and actuarial method of the US Census Bureau.  
2
 Please, see, Appendix B for a detailed presentation of the most underfunded state pension plans. 
3
 There are typically minimum funding requirements imposed by regulation in the US pension fund industry. In 
particular, the required minimum contributions are calculated on the basis of amortizing existing underfunding 
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US public pension funds have been investing an ever-increasing proportion of their assets in 
risky investments (Andonov et al., 2014) and equities (Rauh, 2009).
4
 The latter author finds 
that pension plans have departed from traditional investments, such as government bonds, 
and are heavily invested in risky securities, such as equities, and in alternative assets, such as 
hedge funds and real estate investment trusts, to achieve higher returns and to implement ef-
ficient risk management. 
This strategy stands in contrast with the traditional framework developed in the pio-
neering works of Black (1980), Tepper (1981), Bodie (1990), and Brown and Wilcox (2009), 
who find that pension funds achieve shareholder wealth maximization by investing entirely in 
bonds. Additionally, risky investments make the potential impact of shocks more persistent 
and apparent. At the same time, over the last two decades, the US monetary policy frame-
work has moved radically into an era with lower policy rates close to the Zero Lower Bound. 
With single digit inflation and substantial financial downturns, the monetary authorities also 
launched a variety of unconventional measures, including increases in money supply to buy 
short-term government bonds on the open market and asset purchases, in response to specific 
challenges caused by the 2007–2008 global financial crisis (see, e.g., Adam and Billi, 2007; 
D’Amico et al., 2012; Gali, 2014; Neely, 2015). These measures, known as “quantitative eas-
ing”, were subsequently adopted by other major central banks such as the Bank of England 
and the European Central Bank and have been found to improve economic and financial con-
ditions in several countries (see, e.g., Kapetanios et al., 2012; Joyce et al., 2012; Chen et al., 
2012; Gambacorta et al., 2014). 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
over a time period of 30 years, while the higher the assumed invested return, the lower the required contribution 
by pension fund members. 
4
 In the United States, the Public Fund Boards, which govern public pension funds, decide on the allocation of 
assets. To the extent that they are largely unconstrained in the proportion of funds that can be invested in risky 
assets and in their assumptions on the expected rate of return of the various asset classes, they have significant 
latitude to choose their assets and the liability discount rate. 
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The above-mentioned changes in monetary policy create an incentive for pension 
funds to invest their assets in risky securities. The influence of monetary policy in favor of 
risk taking in pension funds has been ignored by the literature, which instead emphasizes    on 
endogenous factors (e.g., level of underfunding, fiscal and regulatory constraints, and effec-
tive risk management skills) that affect strategic asset allocation decisions (Rauh, 2006; 
Aglietta et al., 2012; Blake et al., 2013; inter alia). There are, therefore, several theoretical 
reasons why pension risk might substantially increase, leading to risk shifting instead of risk 
management incentives.
5
 Motivated by the importance of the research question and the lack 
of empirical evidence on the role of monetary policy changes in pension fund strategies, we 
examine these challenging issues by addressing the following four questions: i) What is the 
effect of unconventional monetary policy on pension fund risk and asset allocation decisions? 
ii) Is there a correlation between asset allocation and short-term lagged investment returns? 
And if so, what is the effect of unconventional monetary policy on this correlation? iii) 
Which of the two arguments, risk shifting or risk management incentives, dominates the risk-
taking behavior of pension funds?  
To assess the impact of monetary policy changes on pension funds, we initially use a 
regression analysis to identify how asset allocation changes over time.
6
 We then employ a 
Bayesian Vector AutoRegressive (BVAR) model estimated over rolling windows to allow for 
structural changes as well as to consider uncertainty about the probability distributions of the 
system’s variables when analyzing the impulse response functions. This model is appropriate 
because it enables an analysis of complex interrelationships, which involves in our case the 
                                                          
5
 Building on the asset substitution problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), risk-management incentives are de-
fined as changes in the allocation of assets that result in a decrease in the risk level of the portfolio (i.e. portfolio 
beta drops). Risk-shifting incentives are changes in the allocation of assets that increase the risk level of the 
portfolio (i.e. portfolio beta rises). For Rauh (2009, p.2689), when changes in the allocation of assets cause a 
drop in the riskiness of pension funds’ portfolios, then these changes have a risk-management incentive. 
On the contrary, when changes in the allocation of assets lead to an increase in the riskiness of pension funds’ 
portfolios, then these changes have a risk-shifting incentive. 
6
 As in Kapetanios et al. (2012), changes in the monetary policy that lead to larger or smaller changes in yields 
are called monetary policy shocks. The underlying structural shocks are identified through restrictions on the 
impulse responses. 
5 
 
interconnections between Treasury yields, interest rates, and asset and risk management deci-
sions. Further, we develop a Markov-switching structural VAR (MS-SVAR) model that re-
laxes the assumption of constant parameters over time and therefore enables us to incorporate 
a more sophisticated treatment of potential structural changes across different regimes (Wag-
goner and Zha, 2003; Primiceri, 2005). The use of different models that vary in their empha-
sis increases the robustness of our findings. We also use these models to conduct a counter-
factual analysis to show that interest rates, and hence Treasury yields, would have been high-
er, ceteris paribus, in the absence of drastic changes in the monetary policy framework. This 
intuition is built on the link between government bond spreads and interest rates proposed by 
Estrella (2005). The counterfactual approach used in this paper is similar in spirit to 
Kapetanios et al. (2012).
7
 
The results of our study indicate that the new monetary policy era prompted a gradual 
increase in pension fund risk-taking behavior. Additionally, risk-shifting incentives to avoid 
low-return investments (such as Treasury bonds) in favor of more risky investments (such as 
equities and alternative assets) dominate the pension fund asset allocation decisions. More 
precisely, in an important departure from prior studies, we separate our sample into different 
time periods to capture the effect of variations in monetary policy on pension fund risk-taking 
behavior. The results over the whole sample period initially suggest that asset allocation is 
correlated with short-term lagged investment returns, and that higher returns precede higher 
equity allocation. This finding indicates that asset allocation is determined by risk-
management incentives. Conversely, the results for the sub-periods uncover the absence of 
correlation between asset allocation and short-term lagged investment returns since 2007–
2008, which implies that the risk-management incentive is not the primary reason for the re-
duced allocation to Treasury bond investments in pension funds. 
                                                          
7
 Additional information on this approach is provided in Section 3.2. 
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If risk management is not the reason why pension funds decrease their investments in 
safe assets and increase their allocations to equities and alternative assets, then what is? 
While the variation in pension fund asset allocation remains unexplained by the existing em-
pirical literature, we find a positive correlation between risk taking and the decline in Treas-
ury yields, which is consistent with a risk-shifting incentive. In particular, we uncover that a 
decline of 5 % in the 10-year Treasury yield over the period 1999–2014 is associated with an 
18% decrease in the allocation of bond securities and a 17% increase in the allocation to equi-
ty. As a result, changes in monetary policy associated with lower interest rates, unconven-
tional measures, and lower bond yields trigger substantial increases in pension funds risk tak-
ing and meaningful changes in asset allocation, in favor of risky investments. 
Further results from the counterfactual analysis of the effects of unconventional poli-
cies using the BVAR model suggest that, without significant declines in Treasury yields and 
the launch of asset purchases, the investment return from bond securities would have been 
significantly larger, from 6.56% to 7.19% for a 100 basis point rise in the 10-year Treasury 
yield and to 7.68% for a 200-basis-point appreciation in the yield, which is similar to the re-
turn percentages for assets allocated to bonds. Notably, in many cases, the assumed higher 
level of interest rates would have helped funds to achieve their planned return of 8%. Simul-
taneously, portfolio risk would have been substantially lower. Therefore, the introduction of 
unconventional monetary policy prompts re-allocation of pension fund assets, leading to in-
creased allocations to risky investments. The MS-SVAR model generates similar evidence, 
suggesting that the risk-taking behavior of pension funds is severely affected by the new 
monetary policy framework. In particular, annual investment return increases significantly 
from 6.56% to 7.74%. 
If Treasury bonds offer an opportunity for significantly lower investment risk, what 
causes the risk-shifting incentive? Our findings provide a plausible explanation and offer 
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strong support for our conjectures. More precisely, the results suggest that pension plans as-
sume an unrealistically high expected rate of return, which they fail to reach on average. In-
deed, the mean investment return across the group of pension funds is close to 8%. This is al-
so used as the typical liability discount rate. Thus, a high expected return protects future pen-
sioners from having to increase their contributions. If risky assets perform well, then the sub-
sequent improvement in pension funding reduces the need for increased contributions. Evi-
dently, a low level of interest rates drives returns much lower than expected, while crashes in 
the stock markets, such as that experienced in 2001 and the financial meltdown of 2007–
2008, meaningfully depress fund assets. 
This study makes an important contribution to our understanding of the determinants 
of pension fund risk-taking behavior. It is the first study to explicitly account for exogenous 
factors that contribute to pension fund risk behavior. Specifically, the critical role of uncon-
ventional monetary policy is amplified as an important component of pension plans. Second, 
it provides new evidence on the effects of monetary policy changes on pension fund asset al-
location decisions, shedding new light on the determinants of pension plan risk taking. For 
instance, rock-bottom interest rates are inflicting increasing pain on pension funds, making 
the challenge of generating adequate investment returns particularly acute. However, too 
much exposure to investments with potentially higher-return but more volatility, such as eq-
uities, jeopardizes the ability of funds to keep promises to pensioners. Third, it contributes to 
the debate on the dominant role of risk-shifting and risk-management incentives on pension 
plan asset allocation.  
Our study is related to the work of Leland (1998), Rauh (2009), and Mohan and 
Zhang (2014), who examine the determinants of pension fund risk-taking behavior. Empirical 
evidence on the dominance of risk shifting in pension funds risk-taking behavior is particular-
ly thin. Specifically, Rauh (2009) finds no evidence that pension funds, and particularly fi-
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nancially distressed funds, engage in risk-shifting behavior. On the contrary, he documents a 
correlation between asset allocation and lagged investment returns, implying that changes in 
the allocation of assets are prompted by an incentive for efficient risk management. Le-
land (1998) assumes that pension funds cannot commit to pension beneficiaries and hence 
take risks with their assets, prompting risk-shifting behavior. Similarly, Mohan and 
Zhang (2014) suggest that public funds undertake more risk when underfunded, consistent 
with the risk transfer hypothesis. We update their work by using a comprehensive sample of 
public pension funds, offering new evidence on the dominant incentives for risk shifting 
prompted by loosening monetary conditions, and providing the first comprehensive findings 
on the critical role of unconventional monetary policy. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant lit-
erature. Section 3 develops the hypotheses and describes the methodology. Section 4 depicts 
the dataset and analyses the results. Section 5 presents robustness checks and Section 6 con-
cludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
Blake et al. (2013) document that, over the past two decades, pension funds have in-
creased the proportion of their assets invested in equities and alternative investments such as 
real estate, and private equities. However, traditional economic theory contradicts this devel-
opment, suggesting that asset allocations and liability discount rate choices should be more 
conservative as a fund matures (see, e.g., Benzoni et al., 2007; Lucas and Zeldes, 2009). 
Therefore, future streams of pension payments should be discounted at a rate that reflects 
their intrinsic riskiness. Specifically, the covariance with priced risks should make pension 
payments certain and minimize the systemic risk. In particular, Black (1980), Tepper (1981), 
Bodie (1990), Bader and Gold (2007) show that pension funds maximize shareholders value 
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by investing entirely in fixed income securities. Bond securities should also, in theory, be a 
dominant part of pension fund strategic asset allocation, for the purposes of optimal risk 
management. Is change in asset allocation an incentive for higher risk (i.e., risk shifting) or a 
more efficient way of risk management? 
The changes in asset allocation do not indicate that fund managers achieve an optimal 
asset portfolio, because asset allocation decisions depend on developments in the economic 
and financial environment. These developments become increasingly important for long-term 
investors, such as pension funds (Campbell and Viceira, 2002, Chapter 1). Therefore, our 
study explores only the incentive for changes in the riskiness of assets. For instance, the solu-
tion to a multiperiod portfolio choice problem can be very different from the solution to a 
static portfolio choice problem (Campbell et al., 2003). Hence, we are not judging the im-
portance of an asset class to derive an optimal portfolio that is hedged to generate the most 
efficient funds at minimum risk (Cochrane, 2014). 
Boards of pension funds have an incentive to postpone the difficult decisions to re-
structure an underfunded pension plan, and therefore prefer to transfer the funding risk to fu-
ture generations. The existing literature presents three explanations for the major shift toward 
risky assets by US public pension funds: i) An incentive created by existing regulatory condi-
tions; ii) an incentive for risk management; and iii) an incentive for risk shifting behavior. 
Given that underfunded pension funds face fiscal constraints, they have an incentive to post-
pone decisions on increased contributions (or decreased pension benefits), taking advantage 
of the existing regulatory framework. Lucas and Zeldes (2009) show that the accounting rules 
for public pension funds create an irregular incentive to invest in equities, since projected lia-
bilities are discounted and calculated on the basis of expectations for investment return, in-
stead of at a rate that reflects the risk of liabilities. Accordingly, public pension funds have 
incentives to increase their investment in risky assets to achieve higher investment returns. 
10 
 
By contrast, Leland (1998) and Mohan and Zhang (2014) argue that the incentive for risk 
shifting (and thus higher performance) is the factor that dominates the pension fund decision 
to move towards risky investments rather than the quest for effective risk management. In 
particular, Leland (1998) assumes that pension funds take risks with their assets, prompting a 
risk-shifting behavior. In a similar vein, Mohan and Zhang (2014) suggest that public funds 
undertake more risk when underfunded, consistent with the risk transfer hypothesis. Our 
study contributes to the debate on the causes of risk-taking and on the dominant role of risk-
shifting incentives for pension plans asset allocation. 
 Rauh (2009) examines the investment policy implications of corporate pension plans 
in the United States and finds that well-funded pensions take more risk while underfunded 
pensions are more risk-averse. This author also documents that: i) pension plans are more 
heavily invested and allocated in risky securities, and ii) the positive relationship between in-
vestment lagged returns and equities is prompted by risk-management incentives, which 
seems to be consistent with the view that heavy asset allocations to risky securities promote 
efficient risk management. Brown and Wilcox (2009) suggest that pension funds should use 
risk-free real interest rates to discount their pension promises, and hence should direct an in-
creased proportion of investment to bond securities. Ebrahim et al. (2014) argue that the asset 
allocation puzzle is purely a partial equilibrium phenomenon, feasible only in the absence of 
capital constraints. Therefore, risk-aversion attitude (such as investments in bond yields) al-
lows for wealth smoothing.  
 
3. Methodological framework 
3.1 Hypothesis development 
The traditional theoretical framework argues that pension funds fulfil shareholder 
wealth maximization by investing entirely in bonds (see, Black, 1980; Tepper, 1981; Bodie, 
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1990). Under this framework, bond-related investments (i.e., riskless securities) are supposed 
to minimize associated pension fund portfolio risk while achieving a return higher than the 
inflation rate. As a result, pension fund strategic asset allocation must be dominated mainly 
by investments in bond securities. Sharpe (1976) and Treynor (1977) describe a pension lia-
bility as a contract between two parties with a put option exercisable in the event of bank-
ruptcy and a strike price equal to the value of pension liabilities. However, over the last dec-
ades, the proportion of pension fund assets invested in risky securities, such as equities and 
alternative investments, has increased considerably (Rauh, 2009; Blake et al., 2013; inter 
alia). Benzoni et al. (2007), and Lucas and Zeldes (2009) provide a plausible explanation for 
this incentive by arguing that the distinctive regulations for US public pension funds link the 
choice of their liability discount rate to the expected rate of return on their assets rather than 
to the riskiness of their assets. Risky investments offer a higher expected return and, hence, 
high liability discount rates. This allows pension funds to present lower degrees of under-
funding and therefore to camouflage their shortfalls. In addition, the introduction of a loose 
monetary policy in accordance with other unconventional monetary tools should create an in-
centive for pension funds to invest their assets in risky securities. We build on these elements 
to hypothesize that 
Hypothesis 1: The incentive for risky investments is determined by the decline in in-
terest rates and the launch of unconventional monetary measures. 
Moreover, as proposed by Rauh (2009), a risk management perspective suggests that 
asset allocation decisions are a function of the funding status, such that underfunded plans in-
vest in less risky securities while well-funded plans invest in more risky assets. On the con-
trary, as discussed in Leland (1998), underfunded plans prefer to increase the percentage of 
assets invested in risky securities instead of requiring increased contributions. These contra-
dictory arguments prompt us to examine the following hypothesis 
12 
 
Hypothesis 2: Changes in the behavior of pension funds are driven by risk-shifting or 
risk-management incentives 
To assess these hypotheses and to capture the impact of changes in the monetary poli-
cy framework, we split our sample data into four periods: i) Period 1 (1998–2000) when the 
10-year US Treasury yield was about 7% and, hence, investments in safe assets were attrac-
tive; ii) period 2 (2001–2005) when stock markets collapsed and interest rates reached histor-
ical low levels to promote a gradual economic recovery; iii) period 3 (2006–2007) is charac-
terized by improvements in economic conditions and significant credit expansion, which 
caused a moderate increase in interest rates; and finally iv) period 4 (2008–2013) corresponds 
to the decline of the interest near the Zero Lower Bound, while the US Federal Reserve an-
nounced a large program of asset purchases and other unconventional monetary measures. In 
addition, we examine several scenarios in which monetary policy changes are less persistent 
to investigate the effects on portfolio risk (i.e., beta) and the allocation of assets to risky in-
vestments. 
3.2 The BVAR model 
Vector autoregressive models, as introduced in the pioneering works of Sims (1972, 
1980), represent a standard benchmark for the analysis of dynamic monetary policy experi-
ments. Our study builds on two macroeconometric models to analyze the effects of monetary 
policy changes on the risk-taking behavior of pension funds. We also conduct a counterfactu-
al analysis with respect to monetary policy changes. More precisely, we simultaneously use a 
Bayesian VAR model estimated over rolling windows where parameters are treated as ran-
dom and a reduced-form MS-SVAR model, in which parameters are allowed to change over 
time. While the former enables us to reduce parameter uncertainty and improve forecast accu-
racy, the latter offers the possibility to capture the potential of regime changes.   
13 
 
Lenza et al. (2010) and Kapetanios et al. (2012) provide a basic framework for captur-
ing the effects of monetary policy changes on macroeconomic variables. Motivated by these 
studies, we build a similar BVAR-based model   
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛩0 + 𝛩1𝑌𝑡−1 +⋯+ 𝛩𝑝𝑌𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑒𝑡        (1) 
where 𝑌𝑡 represents a vector of five variables (the pension funds allocation to equities, its al-
location to cash and bonds, its allocation to other assets, pension fund portfolio beta and its 
return on investments), 𝛩0 is a vector of constants, 𝛩1 to 𝛩𝑝 are parameter matrices, and 𝑒𝑡 is 
the vector white-noise error term.  
We use a univariate AR(1) process with high persistence as our prior for each of the 
variables in the BVAR model.
8
 Hence, the expected value of the matrix 𝛩1  is 𝐸(𝛩1) =
0.99 × 𝐼. We assume that 𝛩1 is normal conditionally on Σ, with first and second moments 
given by 
𝐸[𝛩1
(𝑖𝑗)
] = {
0.99
0
𝑖𝑓 𝑖=𝑗
𝑖𝑓 𝑖≠𝑗
, 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝛩1
𝑖𝑗] = 𝜑𝜎𝑖
2 ⁄ 𝜎𝑗
2      (2) 
where 𝛩0 contains a diffuse normal prior, 𝛩1
(𝑖𝑗)
 represents the element in position (i,j) in the 
matrix 𝛩1, and the covariances among the coefficients in 𝛩1 are zero. Also, the prior scale 
and the matrix of disturbances have  an inverted Wishart prior as explained in Appendix C so 
that 𝛴~𝑖𝑊(𝑣0, 𝑆0), where 𝑣0 and 𝑆0 are the prior scale and shape parameters, and with the 
expectation of Σ equal to a fixed diagonal residual variance 𝐸(𝛴) = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝜎1
2, … , 𝜎𝑁
2). Our 
BVAR model is similar to Bańbura et al. (2010) and Kapetanios et al. (2012) in that it is es-
timated using rolling windows to account for structural changes in monetary policy. Conse-
                                                          
8 We use a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test to obtain the most suitable number of lags. In particular, we let R(a)=0 to represent a 
set of restrictions and ∫(𝛼, 𝛴𝑒) the likelihood function. Then the 𝐿𝑅 = 2[𝑙𝑛 ∫𝛼
𝑢𝑛 , 𝛴𝑒
𝑢𝑛) − 𝑙𝑛 ∫𝛼𝑟𝑒 , 𝛴𝑒
𝑟𝑒)],  becomes 
(𝑅(𝛼𝑢𝑛)′[
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝛼𝑢𝑛
(𝛴𝑒
𝑟𝑒⊗ (𝑋′𝑋)−1)(
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝛼𝑢𝑛
)′]−1(𝑅(𝛼𝑢𝑛)) and we maximize the likelihood function with respect to α subject 
to R(α)=0. We test a VAR (?̂? − 1) against VAR (?̂?) and then a VAR (?̂? − 2) against VAR (?̂? − 1) to obtain the correct 
number of lags. In order to compare the results obtained by LR with other testing procedures we calculate: 𝑇(𝑙𝑛|𝛴𝑒
𝑟𝑒| −
𝑙𝑛|𝛴𝑒
𝑢𝑛|) 𝑥2(𝑣)→
𝐷 , where 𝑋𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡−1
′ , … , 𝑦𝑡−𝑞
′ )′, and 𝑋′ = 𝑋0, … , 𝑋𝑇−1), is a (4×4) matrix (i.e. mq*T) and 𝑣 = 2, which repre-
sents the number of restrictions. 
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quently, the shrinkage parameter φ determines the tightness of the prior which indicates the 
extent to which the data affects the estimates. 
3.3 The MS-SVAR model 
Our sample contains several regimes: (i) relatively high interest rates between 1998 
and 2000 (regime 1); (ii) the stock market crash of 2001 (regime 2), which led to a dramatic 
decline in interest rates; (iii) the 2007 to 2008 period, in which the federal funds target rate 
increased modestly (regime 3); and (iv) the period from mid-2008 until the end of our sample 
period in 2013 (regime 4), in which the Federal Reserve decreased interest rates to near the 
Zero Lower Bound and introduced unconventional monetary measures (i.e., quantitative eas-
ing) to promote financial stability and economic development in the U.S. This pattern of fre-
quent changes in the US monetary policy over recent years led us also to consider a regime 
switching structural VAR model with the following form 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝑍(𝐴)𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡                     (3) 
where  𝑌𝑡 is a vector of endogenous variables, c is a vector of intercepts, 𝑍(𝐴) is a matrix of 
autoregressive coefficients of the lagged value of 𝑌𝑡 and 𝑢𝑡 is a vector of residuals. The re-
duced-form error terms are related to the uncorrelated structural errors 𝜀𝑡 as follows 
𝜀𝑡 = 𝛣
−1𝑢𝑡                       (4) 
The vector of endogenous variables (𝑌𝑡) includes the following four variables in the 
VAR system: 
𝑌𝑡 = [𝑃𝐹𝐸𝐴𝑡 , 𝑃𝐹𝐵𝐴𝑡,  𝑃𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑡 , 𝑃𝐹𝐴𝐵𝑡,  𝑃𝐹𝑅𝑡  ]                 (5) 
where 𝑃𝐹𝐸𝐴𝑡  represents the pension fund’s allocation to equities, 𝑃𝐹𝐸𝐵𝑡  its allocation to 
cash and bonds, 𝑃𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑡  its allocation to other assets, 𝑃𝐹𝐴𝐵𝑡 its asset beta, and 𝑃𝐹𝑅𝑡  its re-
turn on investments.  
We modify the regime switching structural VAR model in Equation (3) to allow for 
changes in the policymaker’s reaction (i.e., regime changes) and to study how pension funds 
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are affected. Thus, we propose an MS-SVAR model with non-recurrent states where transi-
tions are allowed in a sequential manner. Hence, to move from regime 1 to regime 4, the pro-
cess has to consider regime 2 and regime 3. Similarly, transitions to past regimes are not al-
lowed. In particular 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑐𝑠 + ∑ 𝐵𝑗,𝑆
𝑘
𝑗=1 𝑌𝑡−𝑗 + 𝐴0,𝑆𝜀𝑡                    (6) 
Following Jin et al. (2006) and Mohan and Zhang (2014), we measure the pension as-
set beta as the weighted average of individual asset betas, i.e., 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 =
 ∑ 𝑊𝑖 × 𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 , where 𝑊𝑖 is the weight of each asset class with ∑ 𝑊𝑖 = 1
𝑛
𝑖=1 , and 𝛽𝑖 is the es-
timated beta of each asset class. We extend the SVAR model in Equation (3) to the case of an 
MS-SVAR with non-recurrent states to account for the regime-dependent reaction of pension 
funds to changes in monetary policies.
9
  
As in Chib’s (1998) study, the dates of the regime breaks in the model are unknown 
and they are modeled through the latent state variable 𝑆, which is assumed to follow an M-
state Markov chain process (where M refers to the dates of the regimes) with restricted transi-
tion probabilities, such that 
{
 
 
 
 
𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 𝑝(𝑆𝑡 = 𝑗|𝑆𝑡−1 = 𝑖) 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ
𝑝𝑖𝑗 > 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝑗
𝑝𝑖𝑗 > 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑗 = 𝑖 + 1
𝑝𝑀𝑀 = 1
𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 0    𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
          (7) 
Given the number of policy regime changes as described above, M is equal to 4 and 
the transition matrix is defined as 
?̃? = (
𝑝11 0    0
1 − 𝑝11 𝑝22    0
0 1 − 𝑝22       𝑝33
   0
   0
       0   
  0    0            1 − 𝑝33 1
) 
                                                          
9
 Note again that transitions between regimes are allowed in a sequential manner, and thus to move from regime 
1 to regime 4, the process must visit regime 2 and regime 3. Transitions to past regimes are also not allowed 
and, in a similar way to the BVAR model and Equation (5), the vector 𝑌𝑡 contains annual data on pension funds, 
and 𝐵𝑗,𝑆 and 𝐴0,𝑆 are regime-dependent autoregressive coefficients and structural shock loading matrices respec-
tively.  
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Alternative modeling techniques provide different relative weights to the sample and 
prior information. Specifically, unrestricted VARs use information very sparsely in choosing 
the variables, in selecting the correct lag length of the model, and in imposing identification 
restrictions. As a result, unrestricted VAR models may lead to poor forecasting due to overfit-
ting the dataset (see, also, Koop, 2013). Structural and Bayesian methods provide a reliable 
solution for these problems as identified by De Mol et al. (2008) and George et al. (2008). By 
using Bayesian inference, we allow informative priors so that prior knowledge and results can 
be used to inform the current model. We also avoid problems with model identification by 
manipulating prior distributions. Therefore, this is the most suitable technique to employ for 
statistical regions of flat density. Moreover, an important assumption in Bayesian inference is 
that the data are fixed and the parameters are random. Hence, with restricted structural re-
gimes, we do not depart from reality. An additional advantage of the use of structural regimes 
and Bayesian inference is that these techniques estimate the full probability model and con-
tain a decision theoretic foundation, allowing us to reach a sound solution. Bayesian infer-
ence includes uncertainty in the probability model, yielding more realistic suggestions. Also, 
our structural models employ prior distributions; hence, more information is used along with 
95% probability intervals for the posterior distributions.  
3.5 Counterfactual scenario 
To produce counterfactual forecasts, we base our analysis on the empirical work of 
Kapetanios et al. (2012) and assume that without monetary policy changes, the 10-year US 
Treasury yield would have been 100, 120, or 200 basis points higher, for the whole sample 
period, ceteris paribus. In practice, we implement this impact on yields by changing the 10-
year US Treasury yield spread to identify the effect of the simulations on the risk and asset 
allocation behavior of pension plans. Therefore, the effects of monetary policy are captured 
solely through lower long-term government bond yields. We simulate two scenarios: (i) 
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Monetary policy interventions cause a downward shift in Treasury yields; and (ii) monetary 
policy does not change over time, and hence Treasury yields are higher, which is contrary to 
scenario (i). Scenario (i) mimics the real monetary policy adopted by the Federal Reserve 
while capturing the effect of unconventional policies on pension fund asset allocation deci-
sions. Accordingly, scenario (ii) assumes that Treasury yields would have been higher and 
thus we adjust government bond spreads and the overnight repo rate. To identify the impact 
of monetary policy changes, we compare the effect of the two scenarios on pension fund per-
formance. 
Wright (2012) uses a structural VAR model to provide ample evidence that long-term 
interest rates and Treasury yields lowered significantly since the federal funds rate has been 
stuck at the Zero Lower Bound. In a similar vein, Christensen and Rudebusch (2012) find 
that government bond yields declined, following announcements by the Federal Reserve and 
the Bank of England of plans to buy long-term debt. Also, Weale and Wieladek (2016) use a 
Bayesian VAR model and document that announcement of 1% of GDP of large-scale pur-
chases of government bonds led to a rise of 0.58% and 0.25% in real GDP for the U.S. and 
the U.K., respectively. The counterfactual approach employed in this paper is similar in spirit 
to Kapetanios et al. (2012) and goes one step further from the existing literature because it 
does not simply quantify the effects of the policy on pension funds, but it also examines a 
“what if” scenario, hypothesizing that Bond yields would have been higher in a different 
monetary policy framework.  
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Data and descriptive statistics 
We collect detailed information about the characteristics, pension plans, and asset al-
locations for 151 US pension funds from January 1998 to December 2013 from Public Plans 
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Database (PPD) obtained from the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College. The 
full sample includes 2,416 observations and consists of the historical yearly asset allocation 
in various asset classes for each pension fund and the yearly return by asset class from 1998 
to 2013, the latest year for which all data are available. Moreover, we collect, from Bloom-
berg database, yearly data for the 10-year US Treasury yield and the federal funds target rate 
(upper bound).
10
 Figure 1 shows the dynamics of the federal funds target rate and the 10-year 
US Treasury yield. Throughout the 1998–2013 period, the Treasury yield continuously de-
clined from 6.82% in 2000 to 1.49% in 2012. Similarly, the federal funds rate decreased from 
6.5% in 2000 to 0.25% in 2013. 
“Please insert Figure 1 about here” 
Table 1 depicts the summary statistics with information on asset allocation for all 
pension funds during the entire sample period. More precisely, Panel A presents the assump-
tion for annual investment return on a yearly basis as reported by the pension funds. It con-
tains the 1-, 3-, 5-, and 10-year realized investment returns, and the funding gap ratio, which 
represents assets divided by actual liabilities. A value of the ratio lower than 1.0 implies that 
assets fall short of liabilities and thus the pension fund is underfunded, while a value higher 
than 1.0 indicates that assets exceed liabilities, and thus the pension fund is overfunded. Pan-
el B provides the asset allocations for the pension funds and the estimated betas (i.e., the sys-
tematic risk) for each investment. 
Panel A shows that pension funds assume a high expected rate of return, but, on aver-
age, fail to reach that expectation. Hence, our descriptive summary statistics show that funds 
were, on average, underfunded during the sample period. Specifically, the mean investment 
return assumption (henceforth, the performance benchmark) is 7.86%, while the standard de-
viation for the assumed rate of return is 0.42%, indicating a very small variation in the return 
                                                          
10
 Please, see, Appendix A for detailed information on the variables used in the analysis. 
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assumption within and across pension funds. This assumption makes it clear that, if interest 
rates are below 5%, all investments allocated to government bonds and cash will underper-
form on a yearly basis. The realized return for pension funds is much lower than the assumed 
rate of return. We provide the results for the average 1-, 3-, 5-, and 10-year returns and ob-
serve that pension funds underperform their expectations in each case. Indeed, the average re-
turns are 5.58%, 5.22%, 5.36%, and 6.87%, respectively. While pension funds in some years 
achieved returns that were higher than their assumed returns, they usually failed to meet their 
target over longer investment periods. 
It is worth noting that, over the 16-year period, the funds suffered several disastrous 
returns compared to the 8% benchmark. For instance, the low level of interest rates drove 
their returns much lower than the performance benchmark, while stock market crashes, which 
occurred in 2001 and in the financial meltdown of 2007–2008, further depressed their in-
vestments in equities. Therefore, our statistics suggest that public pension funds are assuming 
unrealistic investment returns, which leads to underfunding with annual contributions being 
based on the assumption of an 8% annual return on investment. Again, the majority of pen-
sion funds are underfunded. The mean actuarial funding ratio for 1998–2013 is 82.4% with 
half of the observations lying in the range 70.0%–90.0%. The minimum (19.6%) and the 
maximum (197.3%) ratios suggest a high variability of pension funding status. Further, the 
average actuarial funding ratio declines from 98.9% in 1998 to 70.61% in 2013, suggesting 
that underfunding worsens over the years, which is consistent with the failure to reach the 
benchmark return. 
“Please insert Table 1 about here” 
Table 2 compares asset allocation and portfolio beta by period. We observe that in-
vestments in equities and alternative assets increase meaningfully over the years. In particu-
lar, the average allocation to equities is 42.5% in period 1, and rises to 45.9% in period 2, 
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50.0% in period 3, and 59.6% in period 4. This increased allocation to risky assets implies an 
increase in risk-taking behavior by public pension funds.  Accordingly, allocation to govern-
ment bonds declines from 39.1% in period 1 to 22.9% in period 4. Pension funds allocating a 
high percentage to equities are apparently most affected by severe market downturns. More 
importantly, we observe that the funding gap ratio increases over the years at the same level 
as the proportion of equity investments, leading to an increased number of underfunded pen-
sion funds from period 1 to period 4. This is more evident in late 2008 and early 2009, when 
pension funds with large allocations in stocks were more adversely affected. Equity alloca-
tion peaked in period 4 (2008–2013) when the Federal Reserve lowered its policy rates to 
close to the Zero Lower Bound and announced a large program of asset purchases, confirm-
ing that unconventional monetary measures triggered an incentive for riskier investment (i.e. 
confirming Hypothesis1). Figure 2 also presents in detail changes in the allocation of assets 
from 1998 to 2013. 
“Please insert Figure 2 about here” 
Similarly, portfolio beta follows an upward trend, but increases less than the equity al-
location with increased investments in alternative assets. The allocation to short-term cash al-
so declines over these time periods, since lower interest rates offer an unattractive alternative 
to pension funds, which expect a high annual return. Although the average alternative alloca-
tion over the entire period is 1.84%, it increases significantly over the period and ranges from 
1.83% (period 1) to 6.3% (period 4). In summary, compared to the mean values for the entire 
period, bond and cash allocations are lower, while allocations in equities, alternative assets, 
and real estate assets are higher. Pension funds’ portfolio beta, as of 2013, is higher than the 
sample period average, due to the increase in equity assets and the drop in bond assets’ allo-
cations.  
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Moreover, Panel A of Table 2 shows that during period 1 (1998–2000) pension funds, 
on average, invested more in government bonds compared to all other periods. As a result, 
government bonds represented a higher annual required contribution in pension fund invest-
ments. However, the lowering of policy rates close to zero and the associated decrease in the 
level of interest rates triggered a shift in asset allocations, from government bonds to equities 
and alternative investments. This is evident from the figures for period 2 in Panel B (2001–
2005), period 3 in Panel C (2006–2007) and period 4 in Panel D (2008–2013). Note that av-
erage funding ratios declined over the years, indicating that changes in monetary policy de-
pressed pension fund assets. 
“Please insert Table 2 about here” 
 Panel A of Table 3 presents the top 15 pension funds by liabilities. The funding cov-
erage ratio ranges from 40% to 99%. The 5-year investment return is lower than the return 
assumption of 8% for all pension funds and ranges from 1.7% to 6.8%, confirming the funds’ 
underperformance. However, while the 10-year return presents an improved picture, only two 
funds achieved a rate of return exceeding the return assumption of 8%. Notably, the majority 
of pension funds allocate more than 50% of their investments to equities and less than 25% to 
bonds. Panel B depicts the funds with the higher coverage ratio. It shows that the 5- and 10-
year returns are substantially higher when compared with the fund performance in Panel A. It 
is also evident that these funds allocate a much lower proportion of their assets to equities 
(32% on average) and a higher proportion to bonds (27%), suggesting that investing in equi-
ties does not imply better long-term performance. 
“Please insert Table 3 about here” 
4.2 Risk determinants of asset allocation 
 To shed light on the determinants of pension fund asset allocation, we examine its re-
lationship with: i) the return on pension assets during the fiscal year; ii) the portfolio’s market 
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risk (beta); and iii) changes in monetary policy represented by significant declines in Treas-
ury bond yields. Table 4 shows the regression results using pension fund asset allocation as 
the dependent variable, during the four different time periods. Specifically, a 10% increase in 
the investment return reduces the percentage of assets allocated to Treasury bonds and short-
term cash by 2.06% during period 1, and systematic risk increases by 0.42%  as a result of the 
reduction of assets allocated to safe investments. By contrast, a 10% increase in the invest-
ment return increases the percentage of assets allocated to equities by 4.81%; this subsequent-
ly increases the systematic risk of the portfolio by 0.68%. 
We also find that a similar correlation exists during period 2, where again, a 10% in-
crease in investment return prompts a decrease in assets allocated to safe securities (by 
3.03%), while the percentage of assets invested in equity increases significantly (by 6.94%). 
This relation implies that asset allocation is correlated with short-term lagged investment re-
turns, with higher returns preceding higher equity and lower bond allocation. Interestingly, 
for pension funds with weak funding ratios (Panel B), the correlation between asset allocation 
and short-term lagged returns is meaningfully smaller, implying a risk-averse behavior. How-
ever, in periods 3 and 4, a 10% increase in investment return prompts a decline in the per-
centage of assets allocated to equities, indicating that pension funds allocate a significant 
proportion of assets to alternative investments. The effect of lagged returns is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. As a result, allocation of assets is not correlated with short-term 
lagged investment returns, since higher returns precede lower equity and bond allocation. 
Notably, for all four periods, the allocation of assets is correlated with short-term 
changes in bond yields, since a 1% decline in bond yields leads to higher equity and lower 
bond allocation, as it is evident from Panels A and B of Table 4. During period 4, when the 
Federal Reserve announced a large program of asset purchases and at the same time lowered 
policy rates close to the Zero Lower Bound, the effects are apparent. Specifically, the per-
23 
 
centage of assets invested in bonds for a 1% decline in Treasury yields is associated with a 
10.52% decrease in the percentage of assets allocated to bond securities. The effect of chang-
es in Treasury yields is statistically significant at the 5% level.  
“Please insert Table 4 about here" 
Overall, our results, which are consistent with the patterns shown in Figures 1–2 
where a decline of 5% points in the 10-year Treasury yield over the period is associated with 
an 18% decrease in the allocation to bond securities and a 17% increase in the allocation to 
equity assets, indicate that pension investment behavior is best characterized by the risk-
shifting hypothesis (i.e. Hypothesis 2). That is, a lower interest rate environment and the use 
of unconventional monetary policy measures prompt pension funds to change their strategic 
asset allocation from safe to riskier investments.  
4.3 Results from the BVAR model 
 We estimate the BVAR model using one lag order and a rolling approach for the en-
tire sample period. Our simulations are based on the empirical findings in Kapetanios et 
al. (2012), which suggest that the use of unconventional monetary policy tools, from 2008 
until 2011, may have depressed government bond yields by about 100 basis points. Accord-
ingly, we assume that government bond yields would have been 100 basis points higher in 
our sample period. To assess the impact of monetary policy changes on the asset allocation of 
pension funds, we compare actual returns with those of the counterfactual scenario (i.e., gov-
ernment bond yields would have been 100 basis points higher than actual yields in the ab-
sence of monetary policy changes) and take the difference between the two as our estimate. 
Moreover, we increase the allocations to government bonds and decrease the allocations to 
equities to identify the return to pension fund investments. This procedure is also used in 
Lenza et al. (2010) and Kapetanios et al. (2012) when they examine the effects of unconven-
tional monetary policy on the macroeconomy, and in Ait-Sahalia et al. (2012) when they ad-
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dress the effect of monetary policy initiatives on financial markets. We also use two addition-
al tests by simulating the effects of a 120-basis-point and a 200-basis-point increase in gov-
ernment bond yields and short-term overnight rates for cash holdings, while allowing the size 
of adjustment on the yields to vary over the entire sample period. 
 Table 5 reports the estimated effects of changes in monetary policy on pension fund 
investment return and asset allocation. The mean return results reveal that the decrease in 
Treasury bond yields, following the change in monetary policy, substantially decreased the 
return on bond investments, making these investments unattractive. The largest impact from 
monetary policy changes occurred in period 4 (2008–2013), when the Federal Reserve 
launched a large program of asset purchases and at the same time reduced the official US 
bank rate to 0.25%. There is clearly a risk-shifting incentive to riskier securities, such as equi-
ties and alternative investments, in hedge funds and private equity as a result of the policy 
rate cut-off to the Zero Lower Bound. This evidence suggests that the funding status of a giv-
en pension plan changes in accordance with developments in monetary policy. Under this 
scenario, pension funds tend to invest more in equities and less in safe assets, such as gov-
ernment bonds. 
 How persistent are the monetary policy shocks? We answer this question by examin-
ing the sensitivity of pension fund returns under the assumption that government bond yields 
would have been higher if there were no major changes in the Federal Reserve’s policy over 
the sample period. The results, reported in Table 5, indicate that the portfolio return for the 
pension funds increases significantly from 6.56% to 7.19% for a 100-basis-point rise in yield, 
and to 7.68% for a 200-basis-point increase in yield. It is notable that, in many cases (i.e., in 
period 1 and in period 2) the assumed higher level of interest rates helps funds achieve their 
planned return of 8%. Figure 3 evidences the difference in return under the three counterfac-
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tual scenarios under which the percentage of pension fund assets allocated to equities could 
be lower since investments in safer assets would be more attractive. 
“Please insert Table 5 about here” 
“Please insert Figure 3 about here” 
 In the scenario with higher interest rates, we add the assumption that investments in 
government bonds would be more attractive for pension funds and that they would allocate 
their assets accordingly. For a more meaningful comparison, the allocation to government 
bonds is kept constant at the proportion allocated during period 1. Table 6 presents the effects 
of the monetary policy on pension fund returns under these assumptions. The results indicate 
that the portfolio return would have been higher by 122 basis points, increasing from 6.64% 
to 7.86%, while the portfolio beta (systematic risk) would be substantially lower. 
 “Please insert Table 6 about here” 
4.4 Results from the MS-SVAR model 
 We test for the number of regimes by prior knowledge and carry out robustness 
checks by using the marginal likelihood criterion as introduced by Chib (1998). Figure 4 il-
lustrates the estimated regime pattern for pension asset allocation, while Table 7 identifies 
monetary policy shocks through the changes in the interest rates. In particular, Table 7 pre-
sents the effects during the four monetary policy regimes: i) during period 1 (1998–2000), 
when interest rates increase and reach their peak levels for the entire sample period; ii) during 
period 2 (2001–2005), when interest rates decrease; iii) during period 3 (2006–2007), when 
interest rates increase moderately; and iv) during period 4 (2008–2013), when interest rates 
are set at the Zero Lower Bound and unconventional monetary tools emerge. Similar to 
Kapetanios et al. (2012), the shocks are identified using a sign. A positive monetary policy 
shock that increases the short-term rate is expected to cause a compression in the yield curve. 
On the other hand, a negative shock is expected to trigger an increase in the yield curve.  
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“Please insert Table 7 about here” 
“Please insert Figure 4 about here” 
Figure 5 shows the impulse response functions to Treasury bonds and equity alloca-
tion following a shock to monetary policy. From the figure it is clear that the monetary policy 
regime affects substantially the allocation of assets to equities and bonds. Specifically, the re-
sponse from pension funds was to increase the proportion of equities and to decrease accord-
ingly the proportion of government bonds. This finding suggests that pension funds risk-
taking meaningfully increases with a decline in the level of interest rates and with the launch 
of unconventional tools. These results imply that the monetary policy framework dominates 
risk shifting considerations and they confirm our hypothesis that the incentive for risky in-
vestments is determined by a decline in interest rates and the launch of unconventional mone-
tary measures. 
“Please insert Figure 5 about here” 
To capture the effects of monetary policy changes, we follow the scenarios studied us-
ing the BVAR model, where we assume that government bond yields would have been 100, 
120, or 200 basis points higher, if there had been no dramatic changes in monetary policy. 
Table 8 describes the effects on pension fund asset allocation and investment return from 
these simulations. For a 100-basis-point increase in Treasury yields, the maximum impact oc-
curs in period 2 (2001–2005) and period 4 (2008–2013), since during these two periods the 
unconstrained policy rate declines. Specifically, as illustrated in Figure 6, the investment re-
turn increases significantly from 6.56% to 7.74% for a 200-basis-point rise in yield. Similar 
to the results of the BVAR model, in many cases, the assumed higher level of interest rates 
helps funds achieve their planned return of 8% (in periods 1 and 2). Moreover, the MS-
SVAR model indicates that if monetary policy changes had been less persistent, the portfolio 
risk (i.e., beta) would be smaller and the allocation to bond securities meaningfully higher. 
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“Please Insert Table 8 about here” 
“Please Insert Figure 6 about here” 
Similarly, we also assume that pension funds would allocate their assets according to 
a scenario in which investments in bond securities would be more attractive and that the allo-
cation to government bonds would stay constant at the proportion allocated during period 1. 
The results obtained under this scenario, reported in Table 9, reveal that the investment return 
would have been higher by 122 basis points, changing from 6.70% to 7.92%, while the port-
folio beta would be substantially lower. 
“Please insert Table 9 about here” 
4.5 Policy implications 
The US monetary policy framework has undergone dramatic changes over recent 
years. Short-term nominal interest rates decreased to near the Zero Lower Bound to overcome 
the stock market crash of 2001 and the subprime crisis and financial turmoil of 2008. Our re-
sults constitute sufficient evidence that monetary policy shocks prompted risk-shifting incen-
tives in US public pension funds, pushing the funds to allocate a larger proportion of their as-
sets to risky investments as interest rates declined. This confirms our hypotheses that the 
loosening of the monetary policy framework deteriorated the allocation of assets and pro-
voked a shift in pension fund risk incentives. Moreover, our findings reveal that the source of 
variation in asset allocation can be clearly attributed to shocks to Treasury yields. Evidently, 
rock-bottom interest rates are inflicting increasing pain on pension funds, which makes the 
challenge of generating an adequate investment return particularly acute. Similar results from 
our BVAR and MS-SVAR models suggest that the unprecedented decline in interest rates 
caused an underperformance of 130 and 146 basis points annually, respectively. 
Simultaneously, US public pension funds responded to these changes with a shift to-
ward more risky investments, such as equities, private equity, real estate, and other alterna-
28 
 
tive assets, to achieve the high benchmark rate of return on their assets. This allows pension 
funds to present lower degrees of underfunding, to mask their shortfalls, and therefore, to de-
lay difficult decisions on contribution levels and pension benefits. Currently, fund managers 
have an incentive to postpone painful decisions, to restructure underfunded pension plans; 
they prefer to transfer the funding risk to future generations. Nevertheless, too much exposure 
to investments with potentially higher return but more volatile investments, such as equities, 
jeopardizes promises to pensioners, as it is evident from the 2001 and 2008 stock market 
crashes. As a result, a safety-first investment strategy, in which pension funds allocate a 
higher proportion of their assets to low-yielding securities such as Treasury bonds, seems to 
be a good –though relatively difficult to be implemented– alternative, particularly during tur-
bulent financial periods. 
Moreover, a change in pension funds’ unrealistic assumptions about future investment 
returns could help mitigate the problem of underfunding. For instance, if the assumption was  
a 5% investment return instead of 8%, then pension schemes would change the contribution 
required by (or the benefit distributed to) each member, to close the existing deficit over an 
acceptable time horizon. Additionally, the results provide ample evidence that deficits remain 
stubbornly high, although in the post-crisis (2008) period, market conditions have improved. 
Another potential reason for the deficit is that pension funds are not efficiently hedged for in-
terest rate and inflation risk, which requires effective interest rate and inflation-hedging strat-
egies to mitigate the problem. Finally, a plain vanilla strategy using easy redemption options 
could mitigate the risk of a severe crash in the stock market and as a result minimize pension 
funds’ portfolio risk. In particular, an easy redemption option could be very effective in miti-
gating redemption pressures during stress periods in the markets. 
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5. Robustness check 
The main finding of our study is that the Zero Lower Bound policy and the launch of 
a large program of asset purchases (i.e., quantitative easing) triggered a risk-shifting behavior 
for pension funds to invest in riskier securities, such as equities and alternative investment as-
sets. Allocations of assets to government and Treasury bonds decreased meaningfully as pen-
sion funds looked for higher yield to finance their liabilities. We test the sensitivity of our re-
sults by using different scenarios for the effect of changes in government bond yields on pen-
sion asset allocation, portfolio risk, and investment return. In this section, we adopt the 
Chib (1998) approach and use a particle Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation ap-
proach to test for the number of possible regimes, since less than four, or more than four, re-
gime switches in principle can occur. We also allow the regime to grow exponentially with 
time t, creating robust dependence between the state variables. 
More precisely, the posterior MCMC approach, with a limit of 5,000 observations is 
used to compute the marginal log-likelihood values with the conditional variance depending 
only on past shocks.
11
 A high value of the log-likelihood (i.e., a value closer to zero) indicates 
better fitting. Table 10 presents the results estimated by bridge sampling. The differences be-
tween bridge sampling and Chib’s method are very small. Similarly, the alteration between 
the marginal log-likelihood values increases substantially from regimes 1 to 4, but decreases 
in regime 5 for all the pairs considered, as is evident in Table 10. The increased value in re-
gime 5 implies that the four-regime model fits the data best. 
“Please insert Table 10 about here” 
6. Conclusion 
US public pension funds suffer from severe funding shortfalls, triggered, at least par-
tially, by the stock market crashes experienced in 2007–2008. Evidently, pension plans have 
                                                          
11
 The marginal likelihood can be computed in Markov-switching models in a similar way to Hamilton and 
Susmel (1994). 
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been investing an ever-increasing proportion of their assets in risky investments. In an im-
portant departure from the existing literature, this study provides new evidence on the role of 
unconventional monetary policy for US public pension funds. In particular, since 2007, asset 
allocation has not been correlated with short-term lagged investment returns. As a result, the 
incentive for risk management is not the primary reason for the reduced allocation of Treas-
ury bond investments in pension funds. On the contrary, there is positive correlation between 
risk taking and the decline in Treasury yields, suggesting the presence of an incentive for risk 
shifting. 
 This study also examines pension fund risk-taking behavior and variation in asset al-
location by quantifying the effects of monetary policy shocks. Our empirical analysis is based 
on a Bayesian VAR model and a Markov-switching structural VAR model. The latter typical-
ly allows us to analyze the complex relationships between Treasury yields, interest rates, and 
asset and risk management decisions, while relaxing the assumption of constant parameters 
over time and allowing for a more sophisticated treatment of structural changes in pension 
fund asset allocation strategy. We show that a decline of 5% in the 10-year Treasury yield 
over the study period decreases the allocation to bond securities by 18% but increases the al-
location to equity assets by 17%. As a result, changes in monetary policy associated with 
lower interest rates, unconventional measures, and lower bond yields trigger a substantial in-
crease in pension funds risk-taking and meaningful changes in asset allocation in favor of 
risky investments. 
Interestingly, we find consistent results on the reaction of pension fund investment re-
turn to monetary policy changes, whatever the model used. Indeed, the portfolio return in 
pension funds increases significantly from 6.56% to 7.19% for a 100-basis-point rise and to 
7.68% for a 200-basis-point increase in yield using the BVAR approach, and from 6.56% to 
7.74% for a 200-basis-point increase in yield using the MS-SVAR approach. Notably, in 
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many cases the assumed higher level of interest rates helps pension funds achieve their 
benchmark return of 8% (i.e., in period 1 and in period 2). 
In response to the questions raised in the introduction, we find that: (i) changes in 
monetary policy (i.e., low interest rate environment and unconventional monetary measures) 
lead to the adoption of risky strategies by pension funds and to meaningful changes in asset 
allocation; (ii) without the significant decline in Treasury yields, portfolio risk would be sub-
stantially lower, as documented by the counterfactual scenarios, while the assumed rate of re-
turn would also be meaningfully higher and closer to the average pension plan benchmark 
target of 8%; and (iii) the lowering of policy rates close to the Zero Lower Bound, caused a 
risk-shifting incentive to riskier securities such as equity and alternative investments in hedge 
funds and private equity. 
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Appendix A: Data Analysis 
In the U.S., public sector pensions are offered by three sources: The federal, state and local 
levels of government. Pension plans are divided into two categories namely defined benefit 
and defined contribution pensions. The former has been more widely used over the last years 
by public agencies in the U.S. Each state administers at least one pension system and each 
system has at least one pension plan. A state government usually establishes multiple pension 
plans within one pension system for employees with different job qualifications and tenure of 
service. In particular, our dataset contains: i) Public Employees’ Retirement System (PERS) 
plans –also called Employees’ Retirement System (ERS) plans– offered to all state police of-
ficers, as well as all other qualifying state government employees; ii) the Teachers’ Retire-
ment System (TRS) plan, which is offered for employees of state-sponsored educational insti-
tutions; iii) the State Retirement System (SRS), which is offered to public servants, including 
teachers, municipal workers, and other government employees; iv) plans for public safety 
personnel (PSP); and v) plans for police officers and firefighters. The number of pension sys-
tems in each state ranges from one to six — California and Texas each have six pension sys-
tems. 84 pension systems (out of a total of 151) have one pension plan, and the rest have 
more than one pension plan. 
The major data source for the study is the Public Plans Database (PPD) obtained from the 
Center for Retirement Research at Boston College
12
. The PPD data are collected from plans, 
annual reports, and actuarial valuations. The sample period includes fiscal years from 1998 to 
2013, and covers 151 pension systems from 50 states.  
Plan Name Plan Name Plan Name 
Alabama ERS Alabama Teachers Alaska PERS 
Alaska Teachers Arizona Public Safety Personnel Arizona SRS 
Arkansas PERS Arkansas Teachers California PERF 
California Teachers City of Austin ERS Colorado Municipal 
Colorado School Colorado State Connecticut SERS 
Connecticut Teachers Contra Costa County DC Police & Fire 
DC Teachers Delaware State Employees Denver Employees 
Denver Schools Duluth Teachers Fairfax County Schools 
Florida RS Georgia ERS Georgia Teachers 
Hawaii ERS Houston Firefighters Idaho PERS 
Illinois Municipal Illinois SERS Illinois Teachers 
Indiana PERF Indiana Teachers Iowa PERS 
Kansas PERS Kentucky County Kentucky ERS 
Kentucky Teachers LA County ERS Louisiana SERS 
                                                          
12
 More information is available from the Centre for Retirement Research at Boston College at: 
http://crr.bc.edu/data/public-plans-database/ 
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Louisiana Teachers Maine Local Maine State and Teacher 
Maryland PERS Massachusetts SERS Massachusetts Teachers 
Michigan Municipal Michigan Public Schools Michigan SERS 
Minneapolis ERF Minnesota PERF Minnesota State Employees 
Minnesota Teachers Mississippi PERS Missouri DOT and Highway Patrol 
Missouri Local Missouri PEERS Missouri State Employees 
Missouri Teachers Montana PERS Montana Teachers 
Nebraska Schools Nevada Police Officer  
and Firefighter 
Nevada Regular Employees 
New Hampshire  
Retirement System 
New Jersey PERS New Jersey Police & Fire 
New Jersey Teachers New Mexico PERF New Mexico Teachers 
New York City ERS New York City Teachers New York State Teachers 
North Carolina Local Government North Dakota PERS North Dakota Teachers 
NY State & Local ERS NY State & Local Police & Fire Ohio PERS 
Ohio Police & Fire Ohio School Employees Ohio Teachers 
Oklahoma PERS Oklahoma Teachers Oregon PERS 
Pennsylvania School Employees Pennsylvania State ERS Phoenix ERS 
Rhode Island ERS Rhode Island Municipal San Diego County 
San Francisco City & County South Carolina Police South Carolina RS 
South Dakota PERS St. Louis School Employees St. Paul Teachers 
Texas County & District Texas ERS Texas LECOS 
Texas Municipal TN Political Subdivisions TN State and Teachers 
University of California Utah Noncontributory Vermont State Employees 
Vermont Teachers Virginia Retirement System Washington LEOFF Plan 2 
Washington PERS 2/3 Washington School Employees Plan 2/3 Washington Teachers Plan 2/3 
West Virginia PERS West Virginia Teachers Wisconsin Retirement System 
Wyoming Public Employees Arizona State Corrections Officers Re-
tirement Plan {CORP} 
Connecticut Municipal Employees Re-
tirement System {MERS} 
Iowa Municipal Fire and Police Retire-
ment System {MFPRSI} 
Louisiana Municipal Police Employees 
Retirement System {MPERS} 
Louisiana School Employees Retire-
ment System {LSERS} 
Louisiana State Parochial Employees 
Retirement System {PERS} 
Minnesota Public Employees Retirement 
Association {MPERA}[Police and Fire 
Retirement Fund] 
Oklahoma Police Pension and Retire-
ment System {Police System} 
Utah Public Safety Alameda County Employee's Retirement 
Association {ACERA} 
Kern County Employees Retirement 
Association {KCERA} 
Los Angeles City Employees Retire-
ment System {LACERS} 
Los Angeles Fire and Police Pension 
System {Pensions} 
Los Angeles Water and Power Employ-
ees Retirement Plan {DWP} 
Orange County Employees Retirement 
System {ERS} 
Sacramento County Employees Retire-
ment System {The System} 
San Diego City Employees Retirement 
System {SDCERS} 
Chicago Municipal Employees Annuity 
Benefit Fund {"The Plan"} 
Chicago Police Annuity Benefit Fund 
{"The Fund"} 
Cook County Employees Annuity Bene-
fit Fund {CEABF} 
Boston Retirement Board New York City Fire Dept Article 1B Pen-
sion Fund 
New York City Police Pension Fund Ar-
ticle 2 
Philadelphia Municipal Pension Plan Dallas Police and Fire Pension System Pennsylvania Municipal Retirement 
System 
Milwaukee City Employees Retirement 
System {The System} 
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Appendix B. Most underfunded pension funds in the post-credit crisis period 
 
Rank State 
Funding ratio 
2013 (%) 
Funding ratio 
2012 (%) 
Funding ratio 
2011 (%) 
Funding ratio 
2010 (%) 
Funding ra-
tio 2009 (%) 
Funding ra-
tio 2008 (%) 
Median funding ra-
tio (2008-2013, %) 
1 Illinois 39.3 40.4 43.4 45.4 50.6 54.3 44.4 
2 Kentucky 44.2 46.8 50.5 54.3 58.2 63.8 52.4 
3 Connecticut 49.1 49.1 55.1 53.4 61.6 61.6 54.3 
4 Alaska  54.7 59.2 59.5 60.9 75.7 74.1 60.2 
5 Kansas  56.4 59.2 62.2 63.7 58.8 70.8 60.7 
6 New Hampshire 56.7 56.2 57.5 58.7 58.5 68.0 58.0 
7 Mississippi 57.6 57.9 62.1 64.0 67.3 72.8 63.1 
8 Louisiana 58.1 55.9 56.2 55.9 60.0 69.6 57.2 
9 Hawaii  60.0 59.2 59.4 61.4 64.6 68.8 60.7 
10 Massachusetts 60.8 65.3 71.4 68.7 63.8 80.5 67.0 
11 North Dakota 61.0 63.5 68.8 72.1 83.4 87.0 70.5 
12 Rhode Island 61.1 62.1 62.3 61.8 64.3 59.7 62.0 
13 Michigan 61.3 65.0 71.5 78.8 83.6 88.3 75.2 
14 Colorado 61.5 63.2 61.2 66.1 70.0 69.8 64.7 
15 West Virginia 63.2 64.2 58.0 56.0 63.7 67.6 63.5 
16 Pennsylvania  64.0 65.6 71.7 77.8 85.5 86.9 74.7 
17 New Jersey  64.5 67.5 68.1 66.0 71.3 76.0 67.8 
18 Indiana 64.8 61.0 64.7 66.5 72.3 69.8 65.7 
19 Maryland  65.3 64.2 64.5 63.9 64.9 77.7 64.7 
20 South Carolina 65.4 67.9 66.5 68.7 70.1 71.1 68.3 
21 Virginia 65.4 69.5 72.0 79.7 83.5 81.8 75.9 
22 Alabama  66.2 66.9 70.1 73.9 75.1 79.4 72.0 
23 Oklahoma  66.5 64.9 66.7 55.9 57.4 60.7 62.8 
24 New Mexico  66.7 63.1 67.0 72.4 76.2 82.8 69.7 
25 Vermont  69.2 70.2 72.5 74.6 72.8 87.8 72.7 
26 Nevada  69.3 71.0 70.1 70.5 72.4 76.2 70.8 
27 Ohio 71.9 65.1 67.8 67.2 66.8 86.0 67.5 
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28 Montana 73.3 63.9 66.3 70.0 74.3 83.4 71.7 
29 Arizona  74.1 74.5 73.2 77.0 79.9 80.8 75.7 
30 Arkansas  74.5 71.4 72.5 74.8 77.5 87.2 74.6 
31 Minnesota 74.7 75.0 78.4 79.8 77.1 81.4 77.7 
32 Utah  76.5 78.3 82.8 85.7 84.1 100.8 83.4 
33 Missouri 76.6 78.0 81.9 77.0 79.4 82.9 78.7 
34 California 76.9 77.4 78.4 80.7 86.6 87.6 79.5 
35 Wyoming  78.7 79.6 83.0 85.9 88.8 79.3 81.3 
36 Nebraska  79.2 78.2 81.9 83.8 87.9 92.0 82.8 
37 Maine 79.6 79.1 80.2 70.4 72.6 79.7 79.3 
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Appendix C. The Likelihood function 
 
Following Sims (1980), Equation (1) in 3.2 becomes: 
𝑌 = 𝑋𝐴 + 𝐸          (C1) 
and 
𝑦 = (𝐼𝑚⊗𝑋)𝑎 + 𝑒, 𝑒~0, 𝛴𝑒⊗ 𝐼𝑇       (C2) 
where Y and E are (4×4) matrices and X is a (4×1) matrix, 𝑋𝑡 = [𝑦𝑡−1
′ , … , 𝑦𝑡−𝑞
′ , ?̂?𝑡
′); y and e 
are (4×1) vectors, 𝐼𝑚 is the identify matrix, and 𝑎 = 𝑣𝑒𝑐(𝐴) is a (4×1) vector.   
Thus, the likelihood function of Equation (C2) is 
∫(𝑎 , 𝛴𝑒)∞|𝛴𝑒⊗ 𝐼𝑇|
−0.5exp {−0.5(𝑦 − (𝐼𝑚⊗𝑋)𝑎)
′(𝛴𝑒
−1⊗ 𝐼𝑇)(𝑦 − 𝐼𝑚⊗𝑋)𝑎)}(C3) 
where 
(𝑦 − (𝐼𝑚⊗𝑋)𝑎)
′(𝛴𝑒
−1⊗ 𝐼𝑇)(𝑦 − (𝐼𝑚⊗𝑋)𝑎) = 
(𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗ 𝐼𝑇)(𝑦 − (𝐼𝑚⊗𝑋)𝑎)
′(𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗ 𝐼𝑇)(𝑦 − (𝐼𝑚⊗𝑋)𝑎) = 
[(𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗ 𝐼𝑇)𝑦 − (𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗𝑋)𝑎)]′(𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗ 𝐼𝑇)𝑦 − (𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗𝑋)𝑎)] 
and also 
(𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗ 𝐼𝑇)𝑦 − (𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗𝑋)𝑎)
= (𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗ 𝐼𝑇)𝑦 − (𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗𝑋)𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠 + (𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗𝑋)(𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠 − 𝑎) 
where   𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠 = (𝛴𝑒
−1⊗𝑋′𝑋)−1(𝛴𝑒
−1⊗𝑋)′𝑦 
Therefore we have 
 (𝑦 − (𝐼𝑚⊗𝑋)𝑎)
′(𝛴𝑒
−1⊗ 𝐼𝑇)(𝑦 − (𝐼𝑚⊗𝑋)𝑎) = 
((𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗ 𝐼𝑇)𝑦 − (𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗𝑋)𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠)
′((𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗ 𝐼𝑇)𝑦 − (𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗𝑋)𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠)  (C4) 
+(𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠 − 𝑎)
′(𝛴𝑒
−1⊗𝑋′𝑋) (𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠 − 𝑎)      (C5) 
We derive the likelihood function of a VAR (q=1) as the product of a Normal density 
for 𝑎, conditional on the OLS estimate (i.e. 𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠) and on 𝛴𝑒, and a Wishart density for 𝛴𝑒
−1, 
conditional on a 𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠 from the decomposition of Equation (C4) and Equation (C5) as follows: 
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∫(𝑎 , 𝛴𝑒)∞|𝛴𝑒⊗ 𝐼𝑇|
−0.5exp {−0.5(𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠 − 𝑎)
′(𝛴𝑒
−1⊗𝑋′𝑋) (𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠 − 𝑎) 
−0.5(𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗ 𝐼𝑇)𝑦 − (𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗𝑋)𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠)
′[(𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗ 𝐼𝑇)𝑦 − (𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗𝑋)𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠)]} 
= |𝛴𝑒|
−0.5𝑘exp {−0.5(𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠 − 𝑎)
′(𝛴𝑒
−1⊗𝑋′𝑋)(𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠 − 𝑎)} 
× |𝛴𝑒|
−0.5(𝑇−𝑘)exp {−0.5𝑡𝑟[(𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗ 𝐼𝑇)𝑦 
−(𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗𝑋)𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠)
′[(𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗ 𝐼𝑇)𝑦 − (𝛴𝑒
−0.5⊗𝑋)𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠)]} 
∞ℕ(𝑎|𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠, 𝛴𝑒 , 𝑋, 𝑦) ×𝕎(𝛴𝑒
−1|𝑦, 𝑋, 𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠, 𝑇 − 𝑘 −𝑚 − 1)    (C6) 
where 𝑡𝑟 is the trace of the scale matrix [(𝑦 − (𝐼𝑚⊗𝑋)𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠)
′(𝑦 − (𝐼𝑚⊗𝑋)𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑠)]
−1. 
The conditional posterior for 𝑎 will be normal and the conditional posterior of 𝛴𝑒
−1 will be 
Wishart. 
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Figure 1. Nominal yields on 10-year Treasury bonds and the federal funds target rate 
 
Notes: The figure shows nominal yields from 1998 to 2013 on 10-year Treasury bonds for the U.S. and the federal funds target rate set by the Federal Open Market Committee. 
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Figure 2. The average pension funds asset allocation 
 
Note: The figure presents the allocation for the following time-periods: from 1998–2013 (overall sample period), from 1998–2000 (period 1), from 2001–2006 (period 2), from 2007–2008 (period 3), and from 2009–
2013 (period 4). The sample contains 151 pension funds from 50 states.  
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Figure 3. BVAR counterfactual analysis 
 
 
Note: The figure shows the persistence of monetary policy shocks on pension funds risk-taking behavior. The actual return refers to the achieved investment return in pension assets from 1998 to 2013. Three scenarios 
are simulated, where the Treasury yield is higher by 100 basis points, 120 basis points, and 200 basis points, respectively, to assess the portfolio return. 
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Figure 4. MS-SVAR switching regimes 
PANEL A         PANEL B 
 
PANEL C         PANEL D 
 
Note: The figure illustrates the four Markov regimes, estimated using the MS-SVAR model. Panel A shows regime 1 (1998–2000) where interest rates increased. Panel B displays regime 2 (2001–2006) where interest 
rates declined. Panel C exhibits regime 3 (2007–2008) where interest rates increased moderately. Panel D reveals regime 4 (2009–2013) where interest rates declined near the Zero Lower Bound.
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Figure 5. Generalized impulse response functions to monetary policy shocks 
 
 
 
Note: This figure depicts the generalized impulse response functions of the endogenous variables of the MS-SVAR model during four dif-
ferent monetary policy environments (Regimes 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively). The four regimes represent the identification of the shocks. The 
figure summarizes responses by pension funds regarding the allocation of government bonds and equities following changes in the monetary 
policy framework. The Y axis represents changes in the allocation and the X axis represents the time period. During Regime 1, the Monetary 
Policy Shock causes a slight negative response to government bonds and a positive response (i.e. increase in the allocation) in equities. Dur-
ing Regime 2, when interest rates decline government bonds respond negatively (i.e. downward slope), while equities respond positively. 
During Regime 3, the Monetary Policy Shock initially causes a negative response to the allocation of government bonds (downward slope), 
but later the response of government bonds recovers to higher levels, due to the increase in interest rates. On the contrary, the response of 
equities is initially positive, but later it becomes negative. Finally, during Regime 4 (i.e. interest rates at historically low levels) the response 
of government bonds is overly negative, while equities respond positively.    
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Figure 6. MS-SVAR counterfactual analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The figure shows the persistence of monetary policy shocks on pension fund risk-taking behavior. The actual return refers to the 
achieved investment return in pension assets from 1998 to 2013. Three scenarios are simulated, where the Treasury yield is higher by 100 
basis points, 120 basis points, and 200 basis points, respectively, to assess the portfolio return. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics  
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the 151 US pension funds from 50 states, with 
2,416 observations. Panel A provides the summary statistics for pension plan return assumption, 
investment returns and the funding ratio, from 1998 to 2013. Panel B provides the summary sta-
tistics for the allocation of assets for the whole time period.  The major data sources are the Pub-
lic Plans Database, obtained from the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College and the 
Bloomberg database. 
Panel A: Pension funds characteristics. 
 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation Minimum Median Maximum 
Return Assumption     0.0786      0.0419      0.0575      0.0800       0.0900  
1 Year Inv. Return     0.0558      0.1204  – 0.3070      0.0884       0.3165  
3 Years Inv. Return     0.0522      0.0627  – 0.1370      0.0521       0.1790  
5 Years Inv. Return     0.0536      0.0361  – 0.0354      0.0420       0.2566  
10 Years Inv. Return     0.0687      0.0254  – 0.0147      0.0720       0.1390  
Funding Gap Ratio     0.8244      0.1962      0.1910      0.8250     19.7395  
      Panel B: Pension asset allocation, overall sample period 
 
 Mean  
 Standard 
deviation   Minimum   Median   Maximum  
 Equities  
     
0.5387  
     
0.1227  0.0000 
     
0.5610         0.7540  
 Domestic Equities  
     
0.3621  
     
0.1242  0.0000 
     
0.3850         0.7157  
 International Equities  
     
0.1644  
     
0.0639  0.0000 
     
0.1681         0.3604  
 Bonds  
     
0.2732  
     
0.0970  0.0000 
     
0.2630         1.0000  
 US Govern. Bonds  
     
0.2598  
     
0.1131  0.0000 
     
0.2500         1.0000  
 International Bonds  
     
0.0244  
     
0.0241  0.0000 
     
0.0030         0.0990  
 Real Estate  
     
0.0607  
     
0.0415  0.0000 
     
0.0596         0.2840  
 Cash  
     
0.0244  
     
0.0299  0.0000 
     
0.0017         0.2250  
 Alternative Invest.  
     
0.0184  
     
0.0756  0.0000 
     
0.0440         0.5662  
 Pension Asset Beta  
     
0.5743  
     
0.1938  0.3839 
     
0.5042         0.6988  
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Table 2. Pension fund asset allocation 
This table depicts the detailed asset allocation and the portfolio beta for 151 pension funds from 50 US 
States, with 2,416 observations. Panel A provides the allocation from 1998 to 2000. Panel B presents the 
allocation of assets from 2001 to 2006. Panel C shows the allocation of assets from 2007 to 2008 and 
Panel D exhibits the allocation of assets from 2009 to 2013. The major data sources are the Public Plans 
Database, obtained from the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College and the Bloomberg data-
base. 
 
Panel A: Pension asset allocation, Period 1: 1998–2000 
 
 Mean  
  Standard 
deviation    Minimum   Median   Maximum  
 Equities       0.4252       0.0988  0.000      0.4276         0.5781  
 Domestic Equities       0.3473       0.0659  0.000      0.3401         0.9422  
 International Equities       0.0779       0.0382  0.000      0.0428         0.1935  
 Bonds       0.4094       0.0960  0.000      0.3607         1.0000  
 US Govern. Bonds       0.3910       0.0634  0.000      0.4687         1.0000  
 International Bonds       0.0184       0.0116  0.000      0.0121         0.0380  
 Real Estate       0.0385       0.0361  0.000      0.0390         0.0874  
 Cash       0.1086       0.0573  0.000      0.1006         0.3069  
 Alternative Invest.       0.0183       0.0204  0.000      0.0162         0.0877  
 Pension Asset Beta       0.4846  0.1053 0.000 0.4493 0.5625 
      Panel B: Pension asset allocation, period 2: 2001–2006 
 
 Mean  
Standard 
deviation    Minimum   Median   Maximum  
 Equities       0.4598       0.1173  0.000      0.4922         0.6002  
 Domestic Equities       0.3806       0.0821  0.000      0.3886         0.9166  
 International Equities       0.0792       0.0505  0.000      0.0940         0.2580  
 Bonds       0.3758       0.1008  0.000      0.3979         0.9800  
 US Govern. Bonds       0.3623       0.0647  0.000      0.4635         1.0000  
 International Bonds       0.0135       0.0155  0.000      0.0160         0.0500  
 Real Estate       0.0550       0.0574  0.000      0.0862         0.1208  
 Cash       0.0903       0.0531  0.000      0.1011         0.2464  
 Alternative Invest.       0.0191       0.0226  0.000      0.0164         0.1093  
 Pension Asset Beta       0.5096  0.1207 0.000 0.4683 0.6030 
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Panel C: Pension asset allocation, period 3: 2007–2008 
 
 Mean  
  Standard 
deviation    Minimum   Median   Maximum  
 Equities       0.5002       0.1198  0.000      0.5276         0.7240  
 Domestic Equities       0.3207       0.1036  0.000      0.4045         0.7982  
 International Equities       0.1795       0.0702  0.000      0.2071         0.4083  
 Bonds       0.3306       0.0998  0.000      0.3060         1.0000  
 US Govern. Bonds       0.3250       0.0531  0.000      0.3005         1.0000  
 International Bonds       0.0056       0.0107  0.000      0.0024         0.0400  
 Real Estate       0.0845       0.0603  0.000      0.0629         0.3356  
 Cash       0.0602       0.0221  0.000      0.0684         0.1477  
 Alternative Invest.       0.0245       0.1004  0.000      0.0166         0.1214  
 Pension Asset Beta       0.5433  0.1482 0.000 0.4883        0.6671 
 
 
     Panel D: Pension asset allocation, period 4: 2009–2013 
 
 Mean  
  Standard 
deviation  Minimum   Median   Maximum  
 Equities       0.5964       0.1388  0.000      0.5876         0.7650  
 Domestic Equities       0.3602       0.1352  0.000      0.3899         0.7379 
 International Equities       0.2362       0.0893  0.000      0.2301         0.4287  
 Bonds       0.2441       0.0925  0.000      0.2175         1.0000  
 US Govern. Bonds       0.2298       0.1069        0.000         0.1833         1.0000  
 International Bonds       0.0253       0.0263  0.000      0.0049         0.1102  
 Real Estate       0.0692       0.0485  0.000      0.0654         0.2950  
 Cash       0.0201       0.0391  0.000      0.0017         0.2250  
 Alternative Invest.       0.0635       0.0640  0.000      0.0612         0.5984  
 Pension Asset Beta       0.6881  0.1539 0.000 0.4902 0.7409 
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Table 3. Top-fifteen pension funds by liabilities and funding coverage ratio 
This table provides detailed characteristics for the top fifteen pension funds based on their liabilities (Panel A) 
and the fifteen best-funded pension plans (Panel B) as of 2013. In addition, it provides the 5- and the 10-year in-
vestment return, the percentage of assets allocated to equities and bond securities, and the systematic risk for 
each pension plan (i.e. portfolio beta). The major data sources are the Public Plans Database, obtained from the 
Center for Retirement Research at Boston College and the Bloomberg database. 
 
Panel A: Top-fifteen pension funds by liabilities 
Pension fund 
Liabilities 
(U.S. $) 
Funding 
coverage ra-
tio (%) 
Inv. 5 
year re-
turn 
Inv. 10 
year re-
turn 
% of in-
vestment 
in equities 
% of invest-
ment in 
bonds 
Portfolio 
beta 
California Teachers 222,280,992 67.0 3.72 7.53 53.6 16.79 0.57 
Florida RS 154,125,952 85.4 5.04 7.44 59.09 22 0.62 
Texas Teachers 150,666,000 80.8 5.4 7.2 49.7 14.3 0.64 
New York State Teachers 94,538,800 87.5 5.2 7.5 58.89 18.99 0.52 
Ohio Teachers 94,366,696 66.3 4.87 8.08 52.78 20.19 0.61 
Illinois Teachers 93,886,992 40.5 4.2 7.2 43.9 24.79 0.60 
Pennsylvania School Emp. 89,951,816 63.8 2.5 7.72 21.1 18.2 0.62 
Wisconsin Retirement Sys 85,328,704 99.9 1.7 4.8 36.28 14.83 0.58 
Virginia Retirement Sys 79,077,592 65.9 4 7.6 47.49 21.69 0.52 
Georgia Teachers 72,220,864 81.0 6.27 6.55 73.5 26.49 0.56 
Michigan Public Schools 63,839,728 59.5 6.8 7.4 41.79 12.1 0.62 
North Carolina Teachers and 
State Employees 
63,630,280 94.1 5 6.6 46.4 33.79 0.63 
Oregon PERS 60,405,200 90.6 5 8.33 36.9 21.89 0.61 
University of California 57,380,960 75.9 4.67 6.62 47.99 23.99 0.57 
New Jersey Teachers 53,645,476 57.0 5.32 7.26 39.2 15.37 0.61 
 
Panel B: Top-fifteen pension funds by funding coverage ratio 
Pension fund 
Funding 
coverage 
ratio (%) 
Liabilities 
(U.S $) 
Inv. 5 
year re-
turn 
Inv. 10 
year re-
turn 
% of in-
vestment 
in equities 
% of in-
vestment in 
bonds 
Portfolio 
beta 
Washington LEOFF Plan 2 114.6 6,859,000 3.81 8.29 37.7 22.62 0.63 
DC Police & Fire 110.09 3,644,085 7.19 6.8 52.99 28 0.65 
Washington Teachers Plan 104.9 8,016,000 3.81 8.29 37.7 22.62 0.66 
Washington PERS 2/3 102.3 23,798,000 3.81 8.29 37.709 22.62 0.60 
Washington School Em-
ployees Plan 2/3 
101.9 3,273,000 3.81 8.29 37.7 22.62 0.62 
South Dakota PERS 100 8,803,700 7.11 8.72 50.7 19.7 0.64 
Wisconsin Retirement Sys 99.9 85,328,704 4.6 8.39 48.29 21.03 0.63 
North Carolina Local Gov 99.8 20,338,784 5 6.59 46.4 33.79 0.65 
TN Political Subdivisions 94.96 7,789,873 5.33 6.15 56.59 28.49 0.67 
North Carolina Teachers 
and State Employees 
94.19 63,630,280 5 6.59 46.4 33.79 0.69 
TN State and Teachers 93.33 34,123,560 5.33 6.15 56.59 28.49 0.61 
Louisiana State Parochial  92.5 3,217,464 13.65 7.28 37.4 26.71 0.67 
Delaware State Employees 91.1 8,257,270 5.5 9.39 54.1 21.7 0.62 
Oregon PERS 90.69 60,405,200 5 8.33 36.9 21.89 0.68 
DC Teachers 90.09 1,759,043 7.2 6.8 52.99 28 0.67 
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Table 4. Relationship between lagged investment returns and Treasury yields on pension 
fund asset allocation 
This table presents the results of the regression of the change in the percentage of allocation to bond securities, 
short-term cash and equity assets on the mean investment return per period. It also provides the change in the port-
folio’s beta and Treasury yield based on the percentage of changes in the allocation of assets, for 151 US pension 
funds from 50 States resulting in 2,416 observations. Panel A exhibits results for well-funded pension plans. In 
contrast, Panel B presents results for the most underfunded pension plans, from 1998 to 2013. The major data 
source is the Public Plans Database obtained from the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College and the 
Bloomberg database. 
Panel A: Funding status decile 1 (best funding ratio) 
 
Percentage of assets invested in 
bond securities and cash 
 Percentage of assets invested in 
equities  
 
Investment 
return 
Portfolio 
beta 
Decline in 
treasury 
yield 
Investment 
return 
Portfolio 
beta 
Decline in 
treasury 
yield 
Period 1: 1998–2000 –2.06 0.42 3.67 4.81 0.68 2.89 
Period 2: 2001–2006 –3.03 0.57 6.81 6.94 1.73 7.22 
Period 3: 2007–2008 –5.91 0.85 7.36 –0.87 1.06 6.36 
Period 4: 2009–2013 –8.20 1.36 10.52 –2.39 0.41 7.61 
Probability > x
2 0.48 – 0.52 0.59 – 0.53 
Pension funds
 151 151 151 151 151 151 
R–squared: Period 1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
R–squared: Period 2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
R–squared: Period 3 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
R–squared: Period 4 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 
 
 
Panel B: Funding status decile 2 (worst funding ratio) 
 
Percentage of assets invested in 
bond securities and cash 
 Percentage of assets invested in 
equities  
 
Investment 
return 
Portfolio 
beta 
Decline in 
treasury 
yield 
Investment 
return 
Portfolio 
beta 
Decline in 
treasury 
yield 
Period 1: 1998–2000 –1.90 0.31 2.04 2.66 0.49 1.80 
Period 2: 2001–2006 –2.03 0.38 3.88 3.92 1.08 3.11 
Period 3: 2007–2008 –2.97 0.40 5.92 1.80 0.53 4.87 
Period 4: 2009–2013 –3.13 0.48 6.96 –0.94 0.21 5.05 
Probability > x
2 0.49 – 0.51 0.53 – 0.51 
Pension funds
 151 151 151 151 151 151 
R–squared: Period 1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
R–squared: Period 2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
R–squared: Period 3 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
R–squared: Period 4 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 
       
 
 
 
51 
 
 
Table 5. Bayesian VAR counterfactual results  
This table reveals the effects of monetary policy shocks on pension fund asset allocation decisions and risk-
taking behavior. The time periods are split based on the drastic changes in monetary policy to capture the 
full effects and the changes in the characteristics of the pension funds. Three scenarios are simulated: i) 100 
basis point increase in the Treasury yield; ii) 120 basis point increase in the Treasury yield; and iii) 200 ba-
sis point increase in the Treasury yield, for 151 US pension funds from 50 States, making 2,416 observa-
tions. The major data sources are the Public Plans Database, obtained from the Center for Retirement Re-
search at Boston College and the Bloomberg database. 
 
Overall sample period (1998–2013) 
Estimate Bond securities Short-term cash Portfolio total return Systematic risk 
Mean  3.62% 1.44% 6.56% 0.55 
100bp 4.48% 2.16% 7.19% 0.52 
120bp 4.97% 2.28% 7.25% 0.51 
200bp 5.63% 2.51% 7.68% 0.46 
    
 
Period 1: 1998–2000 
  
 
Estimate Bond securities Short-term cash Portfolio total return Systematic risk 
Mean  5.03% 3.01% 7.86% 0.49 
100bp 5.92% 3.85% 8.51% 0.45 
120bp 6.06% 3.97% 8.64% 0.44 
200bp 7.01% 4.30% 9.28% 0.40 
    
 
Period 2: 2001–2005 
  
 
Estimate Bond securities Short-term cash Portfolio total return Systematic risk 
Mean  3.84% 1.97% 7.12% 0.52 
100bp 4.51% 2.39% 7.70% 0.50 
120bp 4.64% 2.45% 7.83% 0.49 
200bp 5.29% 2.91% 8.33% 0.43 
    
 
Period 3: 2006–2007 
  
 
Estimate Bond securities Short-term cash Portfolio total return Systematic risk 
Mean  2.97% 1.29% 5.87% 0.57 
100bp 4.48% 2.16% 6.51% 0.53 
120bp 4.97% 2.28% 6.70% 0.52 
200bp 5.63% 2.51% 7.49% 0.48 
    
 
Period 4: 2008–2013 
  
 
Estimate Bond securities Short-term cash Portfolio total return Systematic risk 
Mean 1.96% 1.01% 5.10% 0.61 
100bp 2.73% 1.42% 5.62% 0.55 
120bp 2.88% 1.59% 5.75% 0.54 
200bp 3.46% 1.73% 6.34% 0.50 
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Table 6. Bayesian VAR estimation of portfolio effects with higher allocation of assets 
for bond securities  
This table presents the effects of monetary policy shocks on pension fund asset allocation decisions and risk-
taking behavior, based on the scenario that the allocation of assets in bond securities and short-term cash does 
not change from period 1 to period 4. The mean portfolio return represents 151 US pension funds from 50 
States, making 2416 observations. The major data sources are the Public Plans Database, obtained from the 
Center for Retirement Research at Boston College and the Bloomberg database. 
Overall sample period (1998–2013). 
Estimate 
Bond securi-
ties Short-term cash Portfolio total return Systematic risk 
Mean return 3.62% 1.44% 6.64% 0.55 
100bp 4.48% 2.16% 7.48% 0.51 
120bp 4.97% 2.28% 7.57% 0.50 
200bp 5.63% 2.51% 7.86% 0.45 
    
 
Period 1: 1998–2000 
  
 
Estimate 
Bond securi-
ties Short-term Cash Portfolio total return Systematic risk 
Mean return 5.03% 3.01% 7.86% 0.49 
100bp 5.92% 3.85% 8.51% 0.44 
120bp 6.06% 3.97% 8.64% 0.43 
200bp 7.01% 4.30% 9.28% 0.38 
    
 
Period 2: 2001–2005 
  
 
Estimate 
Bond securi-
ties Short-term cash Portfolio total return Systematic risk 
Mean return 3.84% 1.97% 7.53% 0.52 
100bp 4.51% 2.39% 7.91% 0.50 
120bp 4.64% 2.45% 7.94% 0.49 
200bp 5.29% 2.91% 8.52% 0.42 
    
 
Period 3: 2006–2007 
  
 
Estimate 
Bond securi-
ties Short-term cash Portfolio total return Systematic risk 
Mean return 2.97% 1.29% 5.91% 0.57 
100bp 4.48% 2.16% 6.77% 0.52 
120bp 4.97% 2.28% 6.82% 0.51 
200bp 5.63% 2.51% 7.62% 0.47 
    
 
Period 4: 2008–2013 
  
 
Estimate 
Bond securi-
ties Short-term cash Portfolio total return Systematic risk 
Actual return 1.96% 1.01% 5.28% 0.61 
100bp 2.73% 1.42% 5.80% 0.54 
120bp 2.88% 1.59% 5.91% 0.53 
200bp 3.46% 1.73% 6.63% 0.49 
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Table 7. Shocks, regimes and effects – MS-SVAR 
      
Regime/Shock 
Effect on G. B 
yields 
Effect on asset alloca-
tion for G.B 
Effect on allocation in 
equities/Alt. Inv. Effect on portfolio risk 
Peak level for I.R. Positive (>) Positive (>) Negative (<) Positive (lower risk) 
Decrease in I.R. Negative (<) Negative (<) Positive (>) Negative (higher risk) 
Moderate increase 
in I.R. 
Slightly posi-
tive (≥) Positive (>) Slightly negative (≤) Positive (lower risk) 
ZLB and QE Negative (<) Negative (<) Positive (>) Negative (higher risk) 
Note: G.B. denotes government bonds, Alt. Inv. denotes alternative investments, I.R. is the interest rate, ZLB is 
the Zero Lower Bound level for the interest rate, and QE denotes the launch of the Quantitative Easing program.  
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Table 8. MS–SVAR counterfactual results 
 This table exhibits conditional forecasting for the effects of monetary policy shocks on pension fund asset 
allocation decisions and risk-taking behavior. The time periods are divided based on the drastic changes in 
monetary policy to capture the full effects and the changes in the characteristics of pension funds. Three 
scenarios are simulated: i) 100 basis point increase in the Treasury yield; ii) 120 basis point increase in the 
Treasury yield; and iii) 200 basis point increase in the Treasury yield, for 151 US pension funds from 50 
States, making 2416 observations. The major data sources are the Public Plans Database, obtained from 
the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College and the Bloomberg database. 
Overall sample period. 
Estimate Bond securities Short-term cash Portfolio total return 
Mean return 3.62% 1.44% 6.56% 
100bp 4.51% 2.19% 7.23% 
120bp 4.98% 2.28% 7.29% 
200bp 5.72% 2.59% 7.74% 
    Period 1: 1998–2000 
  
Estimate Bond securities Short-term cash Portfolio total return 
Mean return 5.03% 3.01% 7.86% 
100bp 5.98% 3.87% 8.54% 
120bp 6.11% 3.99% 8.67% 
200bp 7.16% 4.38% 9.35% 
    Period 2: 2001–2005 
  
Estimate Bond securities Short-term cash Portfolio total return 
Mean return 3.84% 1.97% 7.12% 
100bp 4.63% 2.48% 7.89% 
120bp 4.69% 2.51% 7.92% 
200bp 5.40% 3.01% 8.55% 
    Period 3: 2006–2007 
  
Estimate Bond securities Short-term cash Portfolio total return 
Mean return 2.97% 1.29% 5.87% 
100bp 4.53% 2.18% 6.54% 
120bp 4.98% 2.28% 6.72% 
200bp 5.72% 2.59% 7.60% 
    Period 4: 2008–2013 
  
Estimate Bond securities Short-term cash Portfolio total return 
Actual return 1.96% 1.01% 5.10% 
100bp 2.79% 1.44% 5.68% 
120bp 2.90% 1.61% 5.77% 
200bp 3.55% 1.76% 6.48% 
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Table 9. MS-SVAR estimation of portfolio effects with higher allocation of assets 
for bond securities 
This table presents the effects of monetary policy shocks on pension fund asset allocation decisions and 
risk-taking behavior based on the scenario that the allocation of assets in bond securities and short-term 
cash does not change from period 1 to period 4. The mean portfolio return represents 151 US pension 
funds from 50 States, making 2,416 observations. The major data sources are the Public Plans Database, 
obtained from the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College and the Bloomberg database. 
 
Overall sample period. 
Estimate Bond securities Short-term cash Portfolio total return 
Mean return 3.62% 1.44% 6.70% 
100bp 4.51% 2.19% 7.53% 
120bp 4.98% 2.28% 7.59% 
200bp 5.72% 2.59% 7.92% 
    Period 1: 1998–2000 
  
Estimate Bond securities Short-term cash Portfolio total return 
Mean return 5.03% 3.01% 7.86% 
100bp 5.98% 3.87% 8.54% 
120bp 6.11% 3.99% 8.67% 
200bp 7.16% 4.38% 9.35% 
    Period 2: 2001–2005 
  
Estimate Bond securities Short-term cash Portfolio total return 
Mean return 3.84% 1.97% 7.58% 
100bp 4.63% 2.48% 7.94% 
120bp 4.69% 2.51% 7.97% 
200bp 5.40% 3.01% 8.61% 
    Period 3: 2006–2007 
  
Estimate Bond securities Short-term cash Portfolio total return 
Mean return 2.97% 1.29% 5.95% 
100bp 4.53% 2.18% 6.79% 
120bp 4.98% 2.28% 6.83% 
200bp 5.72% 2.59% 7.84% 
    Period 4: 2008–2013 
  
Estimate Bond securities Short-term cash Portfolio total return 
Actual return 1.96% 1.01% 5.33% 
100bp 2.79% 1.44% 5.84% 
120bp 2.90% 1.61% 5.92% 
200bp 3.55% 1.76% 6.68% 
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Table 10. Marginal log-likelihood for 5.000 simulations 
This table displays results for bridge sampling and Chib’s method for the marginal likelihood value for bridge 
sampling and Chib’s method. The shortest distance from zero indicates the most appropriate the number of re-
gimes. The most suitable number of regimes appears in bold. The sample period is from 1998 to 2013 and con-
tains a total of 2416 observations. The major data sources are the Public Plans Database, obtained from the Cen-
ter for Retirement Research at Boston College and the Bloomberg database. 
 
Filtered probability of regimes 1 2 3 4 5 
Overall sample      
Bridge sampling –853.82 –844.76 –833.09 –822.23 –829.70 
Chib –849.21 –841.04 –831.71 –820.85 –830.63 
Period 1      
Bridge sampling –938.03 –930.60 –920.33 –909.75 –921.44 
Chib –936.42 –931.93 –921.15 –910.06 –919.10 
Period 2      
Bridge sampling –855.73 –849.01 –840.19 –829.37 –840.62 
Chib –842.88 –834.26 –824.25 –813.65 –824.77 
Period 3      
Bridge sampling –972.11 –963.08 –953.02 –941.24 –951.94 
Chib –956.07 –947.63 –937.19 –926.16 –935.29 
Period 4      
Bridge sampling –968.79 –960.48 –950.42 –939.92 –948.67 
Chib –951.40 –943.85 –934.16 –923.10 –931.80 
 
 
 
 
 
